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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
BRIAN RAY BROADWATER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Case No. 20010702-CA 
(Lower Docket 005907720) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah code 
Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(e), 1953, as amended. In this Appeal the Appellant 
challenges the legality of the district court's ruling denying his motion to suppress. 
A copy of the district court orders and the transcripts of the proceeding are attached 
hereto as Addendums A, B and C. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the District Court err in denying the appellant's motion to suppress? 
Standard of Review: This Court has stated "[w]e review the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous 
standard." State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225,1226 (Utah. Ct. App. 1996)(quoting 
1 
State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah. Ct. App. 1996). This Court has 
further explained "[w]e review the trial court's legal conclusions based on the 
totality of those facts for correctness." Struhs. 940 P.2d at 1227. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellant was represented by counsel at trial which occurred on August 
1, 2001, in the Third district Court. The appellant's motion was filed timely and 
was denied on February 8, 2001. See Addendum A. The appellant filed a motion 
to reconsider the ruling, which was denied on March 28, 2001. See Addendum B. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute and constitutional provision will be determinative of 
the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
United States Constitution Amendment 4 
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 12, 2000, the Appellant was arrested for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol in violation of Salt Lake City Code, Section 12.24.100 . The 
appellant's arrest occurred after he was found sleeping in his car behind a drinking 
establishment. The appellant asserts that his initial detention was unlawful as 
being in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15,1953 as Amended. 
The Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of 
his illegal detention. A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on November 
27,2000. The Transcripts from that hearing are attached as Addendum C. The 
District Court Judge that conducted the hearing did not rule on the motion. Instead 
on February 8, 2001, after the case was transferred to another District Court Judge, 
Third District Judge Skanchy issued a decision on the motion to suppress denying 
the motion. See Addendum A. The appellant filed a motion to reconsider as it was 
his contention that the district court judge needed to review not only the 
memoranda but a video tape of the Motion to Suppress hearing. After reviewing 
the video tape the District Court Judge issued a second order denying the 
appellant's motion to suppress. That order is dated March 28, 2001 and is attached 
hereto as Addendum B. 
Jury Trial on this case was held on August 1,2001. The appellant was 
convicted. A notice of Appeal was filed on August 21, 2001. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 12, 2000, at about 2:10 a.m. Officers Gardiner and Hunt of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department were dispatched to a parking lot to check out a 
suspicious vehicle. The call was apparently made by an anonymous informant in 
that neither officer could identify the source of the original call. See Addendum C 
at 3-4, 11. 
Upon arrival at the parking lot Officer Gardiner observed that Officer Hunt 
was already present. Addendum C at 4. Officer Gardiner testified that he and 
Officer Hunt parked their patrol cars behind the appellant's vehicle and Officer 
Gardiner used his spot light to illuminate the interior or passenger area of the 
appellant's vehicle. Addendum C at 11. 
The officers observed that the appellant was asleep in the car with the seat 
reclined and that the engine was running. Addendum C at 4. Officer Gardiner 
testified that it was a cold night and he believed that the appellant may have had 
the engine running in order for him to keep warm while he slept in his car. 
Addendum C at 12. Officer Gardiner testified that he and Officer Hunt approached 
the appellant's vehicle and pounded on the windows in order to wake up the 
appellant. The reason the officers pounded on the windows was to acquire some 
general knowledge as to why the appellant was there and to see if the officers 
needed to investigate something further. Addendum C at 11, 14. 
When the officers approached the appellant's vehicle, Officer Gardiner 
testified that he had no reason to believe that the appellant had committed a crime 
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except his hunches or feelings. Addendum C at 12. Officer Gardiner further stated 
that he just had a hunch or a feeling that the appellant might be DUI or intoxicated 
and knocked on the window to investigate further in order to get the appellant's 
identification and to see if anything about the appellant was illegal. Addendum C 
at 15-16. 
The officers extracted the appellant from the vehicle after pounding on the 
windows by requesting or ordering the appellant to get out of the vehicle. 
Addendum C at 24. In fact, Officer Gardiner testified that it was "very possible 
that [he] knocked on the window and opened the [car] door [him]self." Addendum 
C at 7. In fact, the officer stated that it was his practice to open the car doors 
himself, he testified "[t]hat's usually what I would do, is open the door." 
Addendum C at 7. This testimony of Officer Gardiner was corroborated by Officer 
Hunt's testimony that he did not exactly remember but at one point of his 
testimony he stated "we got him out." Addendum C at 23. Officer Gardiner told 
the appellant to get out of the vehicle almost immediately upon the door being 
opened. Addendum C at 25. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court correctly incorrectly ruled that the encounter was a 
consensual Level I stop and not a seizure. The appellant was seized when the 
officers opened the door of the appellant's vehicle and ordered him out of the 
vehicle. 
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The lower court also incorrectly ruled that there was reasonable suspicion to 
support the encounter once the officer's had a discussion with the appellant. The 
fact that the officers were called to the lot by an anonymous tip, it was 2:10 a.m., 
outside of a bar and the vehicle was running with the passenger asleep in the 
vehicle does not create reasonable suspicion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE ENCOUNTER WAS CONSENSUAL. 
Discussion 
The lower court incorrectly ruled that the encounter was consensual. The 
United States Supreme Court has said that "in order to determine whether a 
particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter." Florida v. Bostick. 501 U.S. 429,434 
(1991). The Court has also said that a person is seized when "by means of physical 
force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." United States 
v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). 
"The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual 
encounter) and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion) 
depends on whether, through a show of physical force or authority, a person 
believes his freedom of movement is restrained." State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 
1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The court needs to look at "whether defendant 
remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but 
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because he believed he was not free to leave." State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 881 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
In this case the district court order denying the motion to suppress stated that 
the court finds that: 
[t]his was a level I stop, and not a seizure. Officers 
pulled behind the vehicle of deft, had access to leave if 
chose to. No overhead lights or siren. No stealth 
involved, nor any other indicia, such as asking to remain, 
display of weapons or otherwise asked what he was 
doing, did not order out of vehicle, knocked on glass 
(may or may not have opened door). No indicia that deft 
would feel reasonably detained. 
Addendum A. The lower court's finding of fact are clearly erroneous. The 
application of the facts to the law are incorrect. The opening of the door by the 
officer was a seizure and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
The facts in this case are similar to the case of State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). In the Struhs case, this Court held that where a deputy and 
her partner drove down the road with their lights off, stopped about one car length 
away from defendant's vehicle nose to nose, and turned on the police vehicle's 
high beam headlights and the truck's white 'takedown' light, the deputies had 
seized the defendant even though the defendant was not completely blocked in. Id, 
at 1227-28. In Struhs. the Court of Appeals noted that the officer's actions in using 
her white takedown lights was an important factor. Id. The court in Struhs went 
on to note in footnote 3 as follows: 
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Under Utah law, non emergency vehicles would not be able to 
approach defendant and shine their lights on the defendant as the 
officer did in this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-129(d) (1993) 
("Any lighted head lamps upon a parked vehicle shall be depressed or 
dimmed."); id. § 41-6-131 (stating requirements for spot lamps on 
vehicles and noting exceptions for emergency vehicles). 
Id. at 1228. 
In this case Officer Gardiner testified that he and Officer Hunt parked their 
patrol cars behind the appellant's vehicle and Officer Gardiner used his spot light 
to illuminate the interior or passenger area of the appellant's vehicle. Addendum C 
at 11. This conduct was a detention which was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. The lower court's ruling to the contrary is incorrect. 
In addition, both officers proceeded to approach the appellant's vehicle on 
either side and pound on the windows. Addendum C at 13, 22. Officer Gardiner 
testified that he immediately opened the driver side door as would have been his 
practice in situations such as this one. Addendum C at 7. The officer's action in 
opening the car door is a seizure and a reasonable person would not feel free to 
leave. The lower court's ruling that the appellant was not seized by the officers' 
conduct is an incorrect application of the law to the facts. 
It is the prosecution's burden and responsibility to establish that the conduct 
of the officers was not, in fact, an intrusion or violation of the appellant's Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In this 
case, the City did not show that Officer Gardiner did not open the appellant's 
vehicle without the appellant's permission. The lower court's ruling to the 
contrary is clearly erroneous. 
8 
Furthermore, Officer Gardiner ordered the appellant out of the car right after 
opening the car door. See Addendum C at 25. Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, no reasonable person would feel free to put their seat back into an 
upright position and drive away, terminating the encounter. Here, the appellant is 
awakened by the pounding on his windows by officers on both sides of his vehicle 
and observes that there are two patrol cars strategically placed behind his vehicle. 
One of the patrol cars has a spot light on the interior of the vehicle. Immediately 
upon waking up, the driver's door is opened and he is ordered out of the vehicle. 
Under such circumstances, it cannot rationally be argued that a reasonable person 
in the same circumstances would feel free to refuse the officer's directions, close 
the car door, and drive away. Therefore, the encounter in this situation was a level 
two detention not supported by reasonable suspicion. The lower court's ruling that 
the facts of this case do not support a seizure is clearly erroneous and this Court 
should reverse the lower court's denial of the motion to suppress as this was an 
illegal detention. 
II. THE OFFICERS LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
DETAIN THE APPELLANT. 
Discussion 
In order for an officer legally to detain an individual, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the officer must have reasonable suspicion based on 
specific and articulable facts "that criminal activity is afoot." Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1,30, 88, S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15 states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15. 
The officers in this case did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the 
appellant and without reasonable suspicion the opening of the door was unlawful. 
This Court has stated that a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when an officer deprives a person of his liberty by means of physical 
force or show of authority. State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah. Ct. App. 1991). 
Officers must have a reasonable suspicion based on objective facts and not hunches 
as the officers stated in this case. 
Here, there was no reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the 
appellant had committed a crime. In fact Officer Gardiner testified throughout that 
there was nothing suspicious of a particular crime and that the officer just had a 
hunch or feeling that the appellant might be involved in criminal activity. 
Addendum C at 10,13-15, 20-21. In fact Officer Gardiner testified that he only had 
a feeling. Addendum C at 20. 
In State v. Sykes. the Utah Court of Appeals articulated the legal standard 
for reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. 840 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1992). 
When a police officer stops a vehicle, a "seizure occurs, 
giving rise to Fourth Amendment protections. To pass 
muster under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure must be 
based on artd on art icul &le facts whi di, to ith rational 
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inferences drawn from them, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude defendant had committed or was 
about to commit a crime. 
Id. at 827 (citations omitted). 
In order to make a lawful detention of an individual, "the officer must be 
able to articulate something more than 'an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 
or 'hunch."" United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8,109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 
(1989). 
The officer must be able to articulate some unlawful suspicious behavior 
connecting the detainee to alleged suspected criminal activity. State v. Potter. 863 
P.2d 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(no reasonable suspicion based on informants tip 
along with observations by officer). In this case Officer Gardiner was quite clear 
that he was relying on nothing more than a hunch or feeling. See Addendum C at 
20. 
The lower court found that the following facts give rise to reasonable 
suspicion. The court stated: 
Additionally, court finds that after discussion with deft 
he had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, called to the scene by report of suspicious 
vehicle, it was 2:10 a.m., outside a closed bar, vehicle 
running, passenger prone, passed out or asleep in vehicle. 
Addendum B. Utah law does not support this conclusion. In State v. Carpena. 714 
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986), an officer was patrolling an area late at night in which 
a number of burglaries had occurred. While doing so he saw a slow moving car 
with out-of-state license plates pull into a driveway. The individuals in the car got 
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out and the officer seized them. The Utah Supreme Court held that there was no 
reasonable suspicion under these facts. The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
reasonable suspicion did not exist "based merely on the fact that a car with out-of-
state license plates was moving slowly through a high-crime neighborhood late at 
night." State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d at 675. 
In State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this Court found 
that there was no reasonable suspicion when an officer stopped three individuals, 
who were walking along slowly, looking in store windows, late at night, in a high-
crime neighborhood, and who then acted nervous at their initial encounter with the 
officer. This Court held that such conduct did not support a detention based on 
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 89-90. 
In this case the fact that the appellant was merely sleeping in his vehicle 
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion and does not support the detention. The 
fact that the officers were called to a private parking lot late at night by an 
anonymous tip does not create reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. 
The detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the lower court's order denying the motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^^^day of April, 2002. 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Benjamin A. Hamilton, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand 
delivered an original and T copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 South State, Fifth Floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
and I copi^to the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, Richard W. Daynes, 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / tf/Z~~day of 
April, 2002. 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
14 
ADDENDUM A 
DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
FEBRUARY 8,2001 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN RAY BROADWATER, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No: 005907720 
J u d g e : RANDALL SKANCHY 
D a t e : 0 2 / 0 8 / 2 0 0 1 
C l e r k : g i n a m 
Court denies motion to suppress on the following findings: This 
was a level I stop, and not a seizure. Officers pulled behind the 
vehicle of deft, had access to leave if chose to. No overhead 
lights or siren. No stealth involved, nor any other indicia, such 
as asking to remain, display of weapon or otherwise asked what he 
was doing, did not order out of vehicle, knocked on glass (may or 
may not have opened door) . No indicia that deft would feel 
reasonably detained. Additionally, court finds t£xa£-~a£ter 
discussion with deft he had reasonable articula^Ki^8Sp^s4on of 
criminal activity, called to the scene by renc^pSbf"SU-l^a^ous 
vehicle, it was 2:10 am, outside a closed ba^^v%^^^\w^^unni: 
passenger prone, passed out or asleep in vel 
criminal activity. Evidence therefore was T ^ ft1^ MlhTfflhtnf^ nQ^ '^ l 
\unning, 
_8£ 
JuS$kMf 
v*». 
m 
Car .^JLsi 
>H Or jhi¥& 
Page 1 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
MARCH 28,2001 
ADDENDUM C 
TRANSCRIPTS - MOTION HEARING 
NOVEMBER 27,2000 
BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON (#6238) 
Attorney for Defendant 
356 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-3622 
Facsimile: (801) 579-0600 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BRIAN BROADWATER, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
Case No. 005907720 
JUDGE LIVINGSTON 
COMES NOW both parties in the above referenced case, and hereby certify that the 
attached transcript of the Suppression Hearing, Salt Lake City v. Brian Broadwater, case number 
005907720, held August 24,2001, before Judge Roger Livingston is a true and accurate record 
of the proceeding. 
DATED this /S day of V*'*^/**^ 2001. 
BENJAMIN A^HAMILTON 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellee 
RlCHARD W. DAYNES "(7 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / day of /y^»/*—""<y*^"T200h a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATION OF RECORD was mailed, postage prepaid, addressed 
as follows: 
RICHARD W. DAYNES 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office 
349 South 200 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
• ^ 
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Date of Transcription: August 24, 2001 
Salt Lake City v. Brian Broadwater 
Case #005907720 
ATP: Richard Daynes 
ATD: Ben Hamilton 
JDG: Judge Roger Livingston 
1: Officer Scott Richard Gardiner 
2: Officer Roderic Hunt 
JDG: This is the time set then for the suppression hearing in the matter of Brian Ray 
Broadwater, the defendant is present personally before the court this afternoon, and 
represented by his attorney, Mr. Benjamin Hamilton. The City of Salt Lake, the plaintiff, 
is represented by Mr. Richard Daynes, in his swan song, is this your last time then, as 
prosecutor, before me? 
ATP: I don't believe so your Honor, I think there's a couple more, I think it's December the 
sixth or something like that. 
JDG: Okay, all right, anyway, Mr. Daynes is here in his capacity as an assistant city prosecutor, 
and why don't you, can you do this with one witness, do you think? 
ATP: Uh, we'll do our best your Honor, just to get through it with one witness, I'll start with 
Officer Gardiner, I would still designate officer Gardiner as our agent and if Mr. 
Hamilton would like to invoke the exclusionary rule, we'll have Officer Hunt step out. 
ATD: And I would, Your Honor. 
JDG: Okay, I will, because you both called it that, and it's just a little fetish for me, 
exclusionary rule is enforced in the Fourth Amendment law, the rules of evidence call it 
1 
exclusion of witness rule, but in any event, being nit-picky, I'll invoke the exclusion of 
witness rule and ask this one officer just to step right out. 
ATD: Thank you your honor 
ATP: A lot of people just call it "the rule." 
JDG: The rule? All the attorney's call it the exclusionary rule, but um, as if it were the fourth 
amendment enforcement. If you will raise your right hand and face the clerk of the 
court? 
Witness is sworn. 
JDG: Be seated right here, and as you are seated officer, please state your name for us, spell 
your last name, and tell us by whom you're employed. 
1: Scott Richard Gardiner. Gardiner is G-A-R-D-I-N-E-R. Police officer with the Salt 
Lake City Corporation. 
JDG: And you've been employed for how long as a police officer? 
1: Twenty one years. 
JDG: All with Salt Lake City? 
1: Eighteen with Salt Lake and three with Ogden city. 
JDG: Okay, and you were so employed and on duty on March 12th of this year, is that correct? 
1: Yes I was. 
JDG: Mr. Daynes. 
ATP: Your Honor, just for clarification, I note from defendant's motion to suppress, the sole 
issue in this case is that there was not reasonable suspicion to make a stop, is that 
correct? 
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ATD: It is the, that we contest, we're contending that this is a level two encounter, and there is 
insufficient reasonable suspicion to make this encounter. 
JDG: Okay, we'll let's proceed. Just limit the focus then, to that arena, and you'll hear the 
other part, if at all, later. 
ATP: Thank you. 
JDG: If it goes that far. 
ATP: Officer Gardiner, turning your attention to the date the Judge has indicated, March the 
12th of this year, 2000, actually, let me make sure I've got the right date here, I apologize 
your Honor. Let me put all this case law over here. Okay, now it's March 12th of 2000. 
Were you, you were in the area of 1440 West, 200 South, on that date, at approximately 
2:10 in the morning? 
1: Yes I was. 
ATP: What is at that location? 
1: Um, it's a small tavern. 
ATP: And when you say tavern, you mean an alcohol establishment? 
1: That's correct. 
ATP: A place that serves liquor? 
1: Yes. 
JDG: That's what they call a tavern. 
ATP: Thank you. At this location at that time, why were you in that area? 
1: I was dispatched to the area of 1440 West on 200 South, concerning a suspicious vehicle 
parked in the lot behind the business. 
ATP: Okay, at this time you don't know who the individual was that made that... 
1: I don't recall who the complainant was. 
ATP: But in fact, you did drive to that area in that location, is that correct? 
1: Yes. 
ATP: And you found a vehicle parked in the parking lot? 
1: Yes. 
ATP: Were there any other vehicles in the parking lot? 
1: No. 
ATP: What did you note when you arrived at 1440 West 200 South, in the parking lot of this, 
of this, of the tavern? 
1: Actually I was the second officer that arrived, and the first officer, Officer Hunt was 
waiting for my arrival before we made contact with the occupant of the vehicle. 
ATP: What did Officer Hunt tell you about the vehicle when you arrived? 
1: He just stated to me that there was an occupant in the vehicle, asleep. 
ATP: What was the status of the vehicle, itself? 
1: Um, the vehicle, um, was pointed eastbound. It was parked, um, the engine was running, 
um, there was an individual, a lone occupant in the driver's seat, asleep, and the seat was 
moved back, which appeared to allow the individual more room in the vehicle. 
ATP: And he was in the driver's seat? 
1: Yes he was. 
ATP: Did you, what did you do at that particular time? 
1: Uh, knocked on the window, um, got the individual's attention and began speaking with 
him. 
ATP: And did he roll down his window and talk to you? 
1: Um, I don't know if he opened his door or rolled down his window, but he did speak with 
us. 
ATP: Okay, but at some point in time you made some initial contact with him face to face? 
1: Yes. 
ATP: And at that point in time did you notice any indicators that led you to believe that he may 
be someone who is intoxicated? 
ATD: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this, going just to the stop. 
JDG: Oh, well I'll overrule the objection, I think it goes to that, go ahead and answer the 
question, officer. 
1: Um, when I began speaking with the individual, uh, I, uh, observed him, I had a 
flashlight with me, he had very red, glassy eyes, his face was flushed, a very strong odor 
of alcohol coming from the vehicle and very slurred speech. 
ATP: All right, let me back up just a little bit. Before he rolled down his window or opened the 
door, whichever the case may be, did you notice anything about his eyes at that time? 
1: No. 
ATP: Okay. So it was the time he actually rolled down the window and made contact with you, 
in speaking with you that you made these observations? 
1: Yes. 
ATP: Thank you, at that point in time you did the DUI investigation, is that correct? 
1: That's correct. 
ATP: Okay, I have no further questions of this witness. 
JDG: Tell me exactly what you did that caused him to roll down the window? 
1: We just knocked on the window, got his attention, woke him up. 
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JDG: Okay, did you display your badge or any other identification? 
1: Um, my police car was behind his, we both had our lights on, I believe I had... 
JDG: Overhead lights then? 
1: I didn't have my rotating overhead lights on, just my spotlight. 
JDG: Spotlights, okay. 
1: And um, I was in uniform, it was actually a fairly well lighted area at that time. 
JDG: And it was in response to a knock? 
1: That's correct. 
JDG: No verbal command that he roll down the window? 
1: That's correct. 
JDG: And was it immediately upon rolling down the window that you then made the 
observation of the eyes.... 
1: That's correct. 
JDG: And the odor. 
1: Yes. 
JDG: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Daynes? 
ATP: You didn't give him any verbal commands as he was... 
ATD: Objection, leading Your Honor. 
JDG: Sustained. 
ATP: Did you any verbal commands to him as you were looking through the window? 
1: I don't recall. 
ATP: But you're only communication then, was the knocking, is that correct? 
1: That's correct. And I may have opened up the door... 
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ATD: Objection, non-responsive. There's not a question before the Officer. 
JDG: I think he said is that correct... 
ATD: And he said yes, and then he's going onto something else, for what he's further testifying 
about I would object to, even without knowing what it is. 
JDG: The question was, you're only conduct was knocking on the window, and you answered 
yes, is that correct, okay, we'll leave it at that.l. I'd have to say no, possibly no. 
ATP: I'm sorry, I don't understand you're answer. 
1: Well I'm not so sure if I can answer. 
ATP: Could you explain that answer, please? 
1: Um, it's very possible that I knocked on the window and opened the door myself. 
ATP: Did you um... 
1: That's usually what I would do, is open the door. 
ATP: Was that before or after he was awake? 
1: Uh, probably after. 
ATP: Okay. 
1: Or as he was waking up. 
ATP: At any point in time..., um, I have no further questions your honor. 
JDG: Okay, Mr. Hamilton. 
ATD: Okay. You received a dispatch on a suspicious vehicle, is that right? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: And the dispatch you received was just that, it wasn't suspicious of any criminal activity, 
just that it was suspicious? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: And so when you arrived in the parking lot of this tavern and you saw that there was a 
vehicle parked there with somebody inside, and the seat reclined, you didn't have any 
reason at that point to believe, hey this person is breaking a specific law, did you? 
1: Hmm, well I didn't know what law he was breaking, if any. 
ATD: Okay. 
1: There could be a trespass or something, but other than that. 
ATD: It couid've been, but you didn't know what permission he might have received to be 
there? 
1: Didn't know who he was. 
ATD: Okay. So at that point, based on the information you had, it was just a suspicious 
vehicle? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: Without a specification of suspicious, of specific criminal activity? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: And so, Officer Hunt was there before you? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: And where was his vehicle in relation to Mr. Broadwater's vehicle? 
1: It was behind it, but I don't know exactly where. 
ATD: Okay, and his red and blues were going? 
1: I don't recall that. 
ATD: Okay. You pulled in behind Mr. Broadwater's vehicle as well, is that right? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: And you put your spotlight into the cab of, into the passenger area of Mr. Broadwater's 
vehicle? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: And so that was shining right into where his head, or where his mirror is, and where the 
interior of the vehicle was, is that right? 
1: It was lighting up the interior of the vehicle. 
ATD: Flooding it with light, is that right, they're pretty bright? 
1: Yeah, it's quite a bit of light. 
ATD: Okay, urn, so you approached the driver's side? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: And Officer Hunt approached the passenger's side? 
1: I don't recall which side he approached from. 
ATD: Okay. But he approached the vehicle with you? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: Okay, and that's for officer safety reasons that you both show up and do that? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: Okay. And you don't remember where his position was? 
1: No. 
ATD: Okay. But you had a chance to look inside the vehicle before you did anything to attempt 
to communicate with Mr. Broadwater, is that right? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: And his position was in a reclined, you said the seat was back, you meant the back of the 
seat was reclined? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: And he was then lying down? 
1: Well I don't know if it was, I can't remember how far back it was, the seat was back, so I 
don't know if it was lying down, or just tilted back somewhat, but it was back. 
ATD: Okay, it was back enough that you thought, oh, this person's intending to sleep? 
1: Well actually, what I thought is he was passed out. 
ATD: Okay, and people don't just pass out, recline their seat and then pass out, do they? 
1: I wouldn't... 
ATP: I'm going to object. 
JDG: I'll overrule it, we'll (inaudible) cross-examination. 
ATD: People don't first recline their seat, to pass out, do they. 
1: Well I, if it was me, I would recline my seat to... 
ATD: Fall asleep. 
1: Sleep or rest, yes. 
ATD: Okay. And that's, in fact, what he was doing, was sleeping? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: Okay, and so when you approached the vehicle and saw that he was asleep in the vehicle, 
with his seat reclined, um, at that point, you had no reason to believe that this person had 
violated a specific law? 
1: Well that's what I was there to find out, whether he was violating... 
ATD: So you were there to find out if he was breaking the law? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: Okay. Without any information beforehand as to what law he might be breaking? 
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1: Yeah, that's correct. 
ATD: Okay. So you were there just to play out some anonymous citizen's hunch on a 
suspicious vehicle. 
ATP: Obj ection, Your Honor. 
JDG: What's the objection. 
ATP: I'll withdraw my objection. 
JDG: Okay, then I'll overrule it. 
1: I don't know if it was an anonymous citizen, I don't recall who the complainant was, so I 
wouldn't want to say that. 
ATD: So, you don't know if it was another officer, then because... 
1: No, I don't know if it was the owner of the bar, a person that lived in the neighborhood, it 
seems to me that it was someone from the tavern, but I don't recall who that was. 
ATD: But the tavern was empty, right? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: And there was no cars in the parking lot? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: All right. 
JDG: Describe the parking lot. 
1: It surrounds the tavern, it's right behind it, it's just a small parking lot. 
ATD: So you didn't have anything that you could put your finger on and say, I think this person 
has broken x, y, or z laws? 
1: No I wouldn't arrest him unless I gained some other information from talking to him. 
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ATD: Okay, all right, but at that point you didn't have any reason to believe that he had 
committed any crimes, when you approached the vehicle, is that right? 
1: Well I had in my mind of some things that he might have done, but... 
ATD: You had some hunches that you might want to investigate? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: Okay. And they were just that, just your hunches? 
1: Yeah. Strong feelings. 
ATD: Strong feelings, okay. Nothing based on what you had observed up to the point where 
you walked up to the vehicle? 
1: Well, I've got to say that the engine was running and this person was asleep in the seat... 
ATD: But it was cold? 
1: ... behind this tavern. 
ATD: I'm sorry, it was cold out, right? 
1: I was cool out, yeah. It wasn't real cold, but it was cool. 
ATD: You had your heater on in your car? 
1: Um, I don't remember. 
ATD: In Later on, in checking this car, the heater was on in this car, wasn't it? 
1: I don't remember. 
ATD: Don't recall, okay. It's possible that it was running because he wanted the heat? 
1: Sure. 
ATD: Um. You were in uniform? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: The uniform you're wearing today? 
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1: Yes. 
ATD: Okay. And Officer Hunt was in uniform? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: Okay, you approached and you had a spotlight going into his car, you don't know 
whether Officer Hunt had his emergency lights going? 
1: I don't think he did, but he may have, I don't remember. 
ATD: Okay. And you had your flashlight? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: And you shined the flashlight into the car? 
1: I used my flashlight. 
ATD: And you then took your flashlight and pounded on the window to get his attention, to 
wake him up? 
1: My flashlight or my hand, I don't recall which. 
ATD: You don't recall which. And then as he was waking up, you may have, you don't 
specifically recall, opened the vehicle; opened the door? 
1: Yeah, I may have, but I don't specifically remember that. 
JDG: Do you remember him rolling down the window, however, do you remember him rolling 
down the window? 
1: 1 don't know, I don't know what occurred, whether he rolled down the window, or I 
opened the door, or he opened the door, I do not recall that. 
ATD: But you were the one making the contact at this point? 
1: Yes, I was. 
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ATD: Okay. So if you don't remember if you opened the car door, whether he opened it, or 
whether he rolled the window down, it's also safe to say you don't remember what you 
specifically said as you banged on the window, if anything? 
1: That would be a correct statement. 
ATD: Okay. Nothing further at this point. 
JDG: Okay, Mr. Daynes. 
ATP: Yes, Your Honor. This area is within the venue of Salt Lake City, Utah? 
1: Yes it is. 
ATP: And do you see the defendant in the courtroom today? 
ATD: We'll stipulate to venue, and we'll stipulate to defendant as the person in the vehicle, 
Your Honor. 
ATP: Was there another reason why you contact an individual who is passed out or asleep? 
ATD: Objection to the words passed out, your Honor. 
ATP: That was the words he used in his testimony. 
JDG: I'll overrule the objection. 
ATP: Was there another reason why, that you were contacting this individual that was passed 
out on the seat, or asleep? 
1: Really the only reason we were contacting him was because of the call. 
ATP: Okay, but when you actually made contact with him, and you stated that you were maybe 
investigating possible criminal activity, would there be another reason why you would 
want to contact, or was there another reason why you would contact the defendant... 
ATD: Objection, Your Honor, calls for speculation, and he's already testified that he was there 
only to investigate the call. 
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JDG: I'll overrule the objection, (inaudible) answer. 
1: Yes. Urn... 
ATP: And what is that? 
1: Least what I, I don't know what the complainant had observed, because I never talked to 
our complainant, but what I observed is a vehicle in a parking lot, past business hours, a 
lone vehicle, with one occupant, whether that was a trespass, or some sort like, something 
like that, I wanted to find out if indeed it was. Uh, or whether he was just an employee of 
the tavern. Uh, and I also wanted to investigate whether or not this person was under the 
influence of alcohol. 
ATP: Did you have any concern for his safety, being a person that was laying down in a car? 
1: Yeah. Yes I did. 
ATD: Objection, leading, Your Honor, move to strike. 
JDG: I'll overrule the objection, the answer will stand. 
ATP: And what was that concern? 
1: Well that wasn't my overriding concern, but he was alone in the vehicle, and if indeed he 
had been drinking some, or too much, that's just not a good area to be um, impaired in a 
vehicle. 
ATP: And so, you're initial tapping on the window was merely to just make sure he was okay, 
and make sure everything was okay in the area, is that right? 
ATD: Objection, leading, Your Honor. 
JDG: Sustained. 
ATP: What was your reason for tapping on the window. 
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1: Just to get a general um, knowledge of why he was there, ascertain if there was a 
problem, and if we needed to investigate further something. 
ATP: No further questions of this witness, Your Honor. 
ATD: You had a hunch that he might have done something wrong, whether it be DUI, or being 
intoxicated in public place, isn't that right? 
1: Yeah, that's it's just a feeling I had, yes. 
ATD: Okay, and so that's why you went up and knocked on the window and opened the door, if 
that's in fact, what you did? You were going to investigate further, is that right? 
1: Um, yeah, I wanted to investigate further, who he was, what he was doing. 
ATD: Okay, so when you knocked on the window to wake him up, and had whatever contact 
you had, it was the purpose for him to identify himself, and what he was doing there? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: Okay. So your purpose was to get his identification, and to see if you could perceive any 
other things that he might have done, or things about him that might be illegal? Odor of 
alcohol, open been cans in the car, possibly, is that right? 
1: Uh, I wanted to look at the totality of the circumstances, and whether he was doing 
something wrong, whether he had a legal basis to be there. 
ATD: So you wanted to investigate this individual that was in the car? 
1: That's correct. 
ATD: Okay. And you wanted to do so by getting him out, and getting his ID, and asking him 
questions? 
1: That's true. 
ATD: Okay. 
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JDG: You can step down. 
ATP: Your Honor, may I just ask one more follow-up question? When you pulled into the 
parking lot, you didn't block his vehicle in, did you? 
1: Uh,no. 
ATP: So he could have, if he had woken up, he could have driven right out of there, if he'd 
wanted to? 
1: I believe he could have. 
ATP: And in fact you didn't uh, you stated that you didn't put on your flashing lights, when 
you contacted him, isn't that correct? 
1: No, I did not. 
ATP: And when you contacted him, you didn't like, bang on the window, or you didn't use any 
other... Let me rephrase that it is not leading. 
JDG: Well (inaudible), never has one minor incident been more thoroughly examined and 
cross-examined, since Magna Carta was signed. Can I just be hyperbole. I really get 
this, you guys. 
ATP: All right, Your Honor, I just want to make sure, because there is some very detailed, and 
very, case law that is very close... 
JDG: There is. Okay. 
ATP: ...with some very close distinctions, and I just want to make sure we're clear on, Your 
Honor. 
JDG: Okay, I just kind of a gut rule that 30 questions after... 
ATP: Thank you. When you spoke to the defendant, did you use any, how did you do it? 
ATD: Objection, foundation as to when we're talking about? 
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ATP: When you initially contacted the defendant, how did you do it? 
1: I don't really recall my first words that I said. 
JDG: I think the question is going to the initial contact of the vehicle, is that correct? 
ATP: With the defendant when he was in the vehicle. 
JDG: Is it going to get any better since I've heard it a number of times? Do you want to try? I 
mean from either side. 
ATP: Your Honor, I'll rest at this time. 
JDG: Let me just ask this. I don't mean to be smug or smart alecky. Let me just ask you this. 
Are you asking the officer... He has an idea. I don't know what you're asking. Are you 
trying to recount again the knocking on the window, or do you want to, are you asking to 
recount the verbiage after the door or windows open? That's our concern isn't it? 
ATP: What I'm asking, Your Honor, is I want to know the level and tone of voice that was 
used to initiate contact with the defendant. 
1: Just like we're talking now. Um, no yelling, or demanding something, just talking with 
him. 
JDG: When did this occur? 
1: After he awoke, and after the window was rolled down, or the door was opened. 
JDG: Okay, all right. Okay thank you. I perceived you were asking him the behavior as he 
approached the vehicle, but you're question was after that, the colloquy that may have 
occurred, is that what your question is? 
ATP: Um-hmm. My question was, after he awoke, what was his contact, and what was the 
level and tone of voice? 
JDG: I'm sorry, okay. All right. 
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ATD: I just have a couple of follow-up questions on that, Your Honor. 
JDG: Okay, you can do one, I'm being tough on both of you. 
ATD: Um, you don't recall at what point you begin actually conversing with Mr. Broadwater, 
do you? 
1: Well when the door was open, or when the window was down, I began conversing with 
him. 
ATD: So you don't know if it was whether he was outside the vehicle? 
1: He was inside. 
ATD: He was inside the vehicle? 
1: Yes. 
ATD: Do you remember what you first said to him? 
1: Just the general things. 
ATD: General thing being, can I have some identity... 
1: ID and what he was doing. Just those general type of things. 
ATD: So you did ask him for his identity, his identification, is the first thing you asked, is that 
right? 
1: I don't know if I asked for his ID, or I just asked him who he was, I don't recall exactly 
when that came into play. 
ATD: Those went hand in hand, what are you doing here, can I have your ID? 
1: Those type of questions. 
ATD: Thank you. 
ATP: Nothing further. 
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JDG: You may step down. Let me suggest this, since we are um, coming at the end of the day, 
I wonder if the city wants to take an opportunity to respond in writing to Mr. Hamilton's 
memorandum. I did not receive that, and maybe you wanted to... 
ATP: We would request that, your Honor. 
JDG: You know, frankly, it's a little different application, than a traditional Terry stop 
scenario, when the person is already stopped, and I would invite, you, and if Mr. 
Hamilton's wants to submit any supplemental information, you're welcome to do so, but 
this is in fact not a stop, the defendant's already stopped. And there are numerous cases 
that have to do with, for instance, asleep in a public park, public place, that sort of thing, 
and there are even some obligation from law enforcement for safety in public and a 
person who may or may not be in danger, and that sort of thing, but I would just invite 
you to, whatever you want to submit, but just to say to you this is different than a stop, of 
a typical DUI situation, and more typical would be whether or not the officer had 
reasonable suspicion an offense occurred in activating overhead, and stopping a vehicle, 
here the defendant is already stopped, and I would suggest this, it's a little bit different 
legal analysis when he is um, apparently asleep or whatever, in a place open to the 
public, and yet not a place that is specifically designated for sleeping, and if there's 
anything that you want to address, in the memorandum, why don't I give you a chance to 
do that, Mr. Daynes, does that sound fair to you? 
ATP: Yes, sir. 
ATD: And I'd like a chance to reply to that. 
JDG: Sure. 
ATD: If I could reply to that. 
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JDG: Absolutely. I think it's important you both have...Officer thank you very much, Officer 
Gardiner, for you testimony today, and let me just say that it's not unusual that someone 
doesn't document, you know, terribly well, or remember, little nuances of what they, is at 
first blush, looks like, a benign, you know, little inquiry, so please understand that there's 
no judgment or no criticism, I should say, and I, in fact, the reverse is true, I think that 
both the attorneys will join me in commending you for just being very candid, sometimes 
it's not very comfortable to say I don't remember, or I don't know, but, we, I appreciate, 
as the finder of fact, and the judge in this, what appears to me to be your very candid 
answers to some fairly pointed questions, which I don't remember, and I thank you for 
your candor, and straightforwardness with this court, and for the attorneys with their, as 
usual, excellent presentations. Let's just talk about a time frame, and then I'll issue a 
ruling when I get, whenever you're done, submitting whatever it is you want to do. And 
why don't we do this, let's make it really user friendly, that Mr. Hamilton, you've given 
something in writing, you don't have to submit any more, but you can, if you want to, I'll 
let you respond to Mr. Daynes, if you want to, and, or not, and if you're comfortable just 
submitting it on what he presents then that's great too. 
ATP: Your Honor, would you, I do have another, the other witness here, and I know that there 
were some facts that Officer Gardiner could not remember that may be helpful... 
JDG: It's your case. If there's something new, I don't need to have to have just reiterated what 
Officer Gardiner said, but if there's something different information, it's Officer Hunt is 
it? 
2: Yes. 
JDG: Do you want him to come forward and testify quickly? 
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ATP: I have a few, a couple of questions that I think that I would like to ask Officer Hunt 
(inaudible). 
JDG: Okay, come forward Officer, and I'll place you under oath. A couple meaning, not more 
than five, right? 
ATP: No more than ten. 
Witness is sworn. 
JDG: Be seated right here. 
ATP: Officer Hunt, you are a police officer, a Salt Lake City police officer, that responded on 
March 12, at 2:10, with Officer Gardiner at the location of 1440 West 200 South, is that 
correct? 
2: Yes. 
ATP: And at that location, you were in fact the initial Officer at that location, is that correct? 
2: When you say, what do you mean initial? 
ATP: You were the first officer to arrive? 
2: Right. 
ATP: Did you activate your overhead lights? 
2: No, I did not. 
ATP: And when, the defendant, which has already been stipulated to, is seated at defense table 
here, when you contacted the defendant, how was the contact made, exactly? 
2: We had our headlights on, when we pulled up, and we both got out and shined our 
flashlight inside his car. 
ATP: And how was the contact made? With him? How did you make... 
2: We pound on the window, for him to get our attention to wake up. 
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ATP: Okay, when in fact, he woke up, after you knocked on the window, what was stated then, 
I'm sorry... 
JDG: What happened after you knocked on the window? 
ATP: What happened? 
2: He woke up, and he opened the, I think he opened the door or the window, I'm not sure 
exactly what he did first. 
ATP: So he opened the door? 
2: Right. 
ATD: Objection, leading, Your Honor, he just said he's not sure. 
ATP: No, he said he wasn't sure which, he did say he opened the door or the window. 
JDG: Um, well let's have the witness clarify that, what do you remember that occurred after 
you knocked on the window. 
ATP: What happened? 
JS6: Well, like I say, he opened the door, and we got him out. 
JDG: Can you remember specifically it was the defendant who opened the door as opposed to 
you or Officer Gardiner? 
2: I'm on the other side, I'm on the passenger's side, and Officer Gardiner is on the driver's 
side. 
ATP: Do you know who opened the door? 
2: I don't remember, all I remember is that we opened the door, well I'm not sure who 
opened the door first. 
ATP: Do you know if the defendant rolled down the window? 
2: I don't remember that at all either. 
23 
ATP: Okay, so you don't know who made that contact by either opening the door, whether it 
was Officer Gardiner, or whether it was the defendant? 
2: Right, I'm not sure who did. 
ATP: Okay, no further questions, Your Honor. 
JDG: Do you have any cross? 
ATD: Just briefly, Your Honor, I promise. So after the door was open, you testified that we got 
him out, meaning you and Officer Gardiner got the defendant out of the vehicle, is that 
right? 
2: Right, right. 
ATD: And that was done by just requesting that he get out of the vehicle, or ordering him, hey I 
want you to step out of the vehicle, please? 
2: Right, yeah. 
ATD: Okay. 
JDG: Thank you very much, Officer Hunt, thank you. 
ATP: Your Honor, let me, I think there's something that's been brought up by defense 
question, questioning that I need to clarify. Did you talk to the defendant before he 
actually got out of the vehicle? 
2: Did I talk to him? 
ATP: Did Officer Gardiner talk to the defendant before he got out of the vehicle? 
2: Well he told him to get out, he was still inside. 
ATP: What I'm saying is, did he ask him any questions before he got out of the vehicle, did he 
talk to him in any way, make any kind of contact? 
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2: I don't remember that at all, if there was any exchange, I mean, conversation, before he 
got out, all I remember, he was asked to get out of the car. 
ATP: Okay, so you're not sure what happened in between the knock and him getting out of the 
vehicle? Whether there was some conversation? 
2: Right I'm not sure. 
ATP: Okay, no further question, Your Honor. 
ATD: Just to clarify counsel's last question, you do remember the door being open, right? 
2: Right? 
ATD: And you remember the first question to the defendant was, will you please step out of the 
vehicle, or get out of the vehicle please, or something to that effect. 
2: Well I'm not sure if that was the first one, but I just remember he was asked to get out of 
the car. 
ATD: That happened almost immediately after the door was opened, is that right? 
2: I believe so. 
ATD: Okay, thank you. 
JDG: You may step down, thank you Officer. Okay, I think we just need to look at the case 
law about finding sleeping persons, apparently unconscious or sleeping, in cars with 
motors running, whether or not that constitutes reasonable suspicion for an officer to 
make a inquiry as to identity. So um, Mr. Daynes, tell me about how long that you want 
to look at the case law bit, and submit something to me. 
ATP: Your Honor, I'm headed out of town for depositions in two days, I'll be gone until 
Monday, if I could maybe have a couple of weeks, would that be too long? 
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JDG: No, we have the, I mean, we've got to do this right. I just worried about, when do you go 
over to Judge Atherton's court. 
ATP: Well regardless of whether I go to Judge Atherton's court, Your Honor, I'll be glad to 
come back and argue any motion. 
JDG: Well I have a date on the, I have a city calendar on the 18th of December, I'm just 
wondering if I could just have it submitted by then, and whatever you guys want to 
submit, and I'll rule on it then? 
ATP: That would... 
ATD: Your Honor, what I'd like to do, if I may, is I'd like to get a copy of the videotape, 
because I think what we need to do is be able to cite to testimony, and we can do that 
without getting a transcript, just copy the videotape and cite in the videotape to the time, 
in the, that's imprinted on the videotape, so that when we do present our memoranda that 
it can be referenced and we can create a good record as to what's going on and what 
we're actually arguing based on what testimony was presented. 
JDG: Well, why don't we do this, we don't need to schedule a court hearing, just how long do 
you need, pick the date in December, 20th of December.you'11 have yours done? 
ATP: That would be great your Honor. 
JDG: I want you to have something to us by the 20th of December, and then Mr. Hamilton, if 
urn, till the 5th of January? 
ATD: That'd be fine. 
JDG: Is that okay? 
ATD: Yes. 
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JDG: Then I will put this on the calendar for the 8th of January, but I'm not going to require 
him to be present, um, I'm just going to tell you, I'm going to decide, okay. 
ATD: Will that be a written ruling, Your Honor? 
JDG: Ah, no, I don't have the ability to do that, we don't have secretaries, or I don't have a 
clerk, I mean, an intern, not a clerk, you know what I mean. Gina would throw her pencil 
at me, if I told her we were going to write that, and that's not going to happen. So um, 
the prevailing party can write an order, if you want to do that. 
ATP: So is that January 8th, is that correct. 
JDG: January 8th, that's on the regular city trial calendar. Um, Mr. Hamilton, you know, if it's 
possible for you to come then, we could, if I denied the motion to suppress, then we 
could set a trial date, if I grant it, then obviously the case will be dismissed. 
ATD: Let me be clear, my reply is due by January 8th? 
JDG: The 5th I thought. We can make it longer. 
ATD: Can I make it the 8th for the weekend? 
JDG: Sure, pick a date and then I want to read them, so why don't we... So how about, I've got 
a city date on the 22nd of January, how about that? How about the 10th of January for you 
then, since I won't, you can get yours in by the 10th, is that plenty of time for everybody? 
20th of December for Mr. Daynes, and 10th of January for Mr. Hamilton? Submit 
whatever you want to, and then on the 22nd of January, on the city calendar, I'll have the 
files here, and I will have read and thought about it and reflected on the evidence, and I'll 
make a ruling on the 22nd of January. 
ATD: And is that the afternoon calendar? 
JDG: That is, that's the two o'clock calendar. 
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ATD: Will my client need to be here, Your Honor. 
JDG: No, I don't want to punish him or you, for our schedule. Well let me just say this, as long 
as you're comfortable that if the motion is denied, and the matter is then set for trial, if, 
that Mr. Broadwater will... 
ATD: P11 be in communication... 
JDG: Yeah, as long as you comfortable that you're not going to resist a warrant being issued 
because he didn't know about the trial date, that sort of thing. Pll actually excuse his 
appearance on the 22nd, as long as you have authority to accept and set a trial date. And 
if you don't want to be here Mr. Hamilton, we can even communicate telephonically and 
we can set it that way too. 
ATD: Thank you. 
JDG: If you can, Pd like you to be here, because... 
ATD: Pll be here. 
JDG: With open day timers, and he can't make a date, and you know what I mean. 
ATD: My calendar is bad enough that I need to be here. 
JDG: Okay, if you can, that'd be great. 
ATP: Okay. 
ATD: Thank you. 
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